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TEN THOUSAND TINY CLIENTS: THE
ETHICAL DUTY OF REPRESENTATION IN
CHILDREN'S CLASS-ACTION CASES
Martha Matthews*
INTRODUCTION
N 1991, public interest lawyers filed a class action challenging a
broad array of deficiencies in Arkansas' foster care system.' These
lawyers represented a class of thousands of plaintiffs, ranging from
infants to teenagers. The class included children living at home but at
risk of abuse or neglect, and children in foster homes, group homes,
and institutions.
Settlement negotiations began, and the lawyers for both sides
started writing a decree that would affect every aspect of these chil-
dren's lives-their living situations, health care, therapy, school place-
ment, interactions with their parents and siblings, and plans for their
future. Among the hundreds of issues in the negotiations was whether
the settlement should set standards for visitation among siblings
placed in different foster homes. The plaintiffs' lawyers saw this as a
minor issue, they would bargain away if necessary.
One of the lawyers then happened to attend a conference at which a
teenage foster child was the keynote speaker. The child described
many bad experiences, but the worst, she said, was finding out that she
had grown up within twenty miles of her brother. She had been sepa-
rated from him at the age of three, and was never told where he lived
or allowed to visit him. The lawyer hurried back to the negotiating
table and insisted on strict standards for sibling placement and
visitation.
The lawyer sincerely believed she was fulfilling her duty to repre-
sent her clients. Both before filing and during settlement talks, she
and her cocounsel interviewed scores of people: children in foster
care, foster parents, birth-parents and relatives, doctors, teachers, so-
cial workers, and juvenile court lawyers and judges. And yet, had it
not been for the chance occurrence described above, sibling contact
would not have been a priority in the settlement.
I was that lawyer. Several years later, I am still troubled by the
question of what it meant for me to "represent" those thousands of
* Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. J.D., Boalt Hall School of
Law, B.A. Swarthmore College. From 1990-95, the author was a staff attorney at the
National Center for Youth Law in San Francisco, specializing in child welfare reform
litigation.
1. Angela R. v. Clinton, LRC-91-415 (E.D. Ark. filed July 3, 1991), consent de-
cree vacated, 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1993), settlement approved, LRC-91-415 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 14, 1994).
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children. Many of them could not speak, much less tell me what to
insist on, and what to give up, in the settlement negotiations that
would so deeply affect their future lives.
In this Article, I will criticize past cases in which the attorneys could
have done more to truly represent their child clients. I do'not mean to
impugn the competence or good faith of these attorneys-for I have
been one of them, and experienced the pressures and constraints they
work under. My goal, instead, is to explore the meaning of the ethical
duty of representation in the difficult context of class actions on behalf
of children, and develop ways to better fulfill this duty in future cases.
I will focus, more specifically, on structural reform2 litigation under-
taken to effect changes in the rules and practices of public institutions
or social service systems such as schools, juvenile justice facilities,
mental hospitals, foster care systems, or welfare programs. These
changes are intended to improve protections for the civil liberties,
safety, health, and well-being of the usually poor and minority chil-
dren and families these systems affect.
Indeed, a surprisingly large part of all structural reform litigation
involves children as plaintiffs-such as school desegregation cases,
cases attacking conditions in juvenile halls and mental institutions,
foster care reform litigation, and welfare benefits litigation. Yet, for
all that has been written about these cases, few commentators have
paused to consider the unique and troubling ethical issues they raise.
Any discussion of the ethical duties of children's class action law-
yers must be situated within a larger debate over the legitimacy of
structural reform litigation itself. This litigation involves judges and
lawyers in shaping broad, long-lasting injunctive relief, and making
administrative and political decisions affecting the everyday policies
and practices of public institutions and service systems.3 The legiti-
macy of structural reform litigation has been challenged through
charges that activist lawyers are using the courts to advance political
goals of their own that are divorced from the legal rights and interests
of real clients. Lawyers are accused of usurping the democratic pro-
cess, thwarting legislative and executive decisions, and wielding un-
2. The term comes from Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Cour4 1978 Term-Fore-
word: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, at 21, 26 (1979). Structural reform
litigation on behalf of children has, over the past few decades, emergedas a specialty
within the public interest law movement. For descriptions of such litigation, see Mark
Soler & Loren Warboys, Services for Violent and Severely Disturbed Children: The
Willie M. Litigation, in Stepping Stones: Successful Advocacy for Children 61 (Sheryl
Dicker ed., 1990) [hereinafter Stepping Stones]; Robert H. Mnookin, Defining the
Questions, in In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy
'- 43, 44-51 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985) [hereinafter Interest of Children]; Marcia
Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation after the Warren
Years, 20 Faro. L.Q. 255 (1986).
3. See generally Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Sug-
gested Perspective, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 492 (1982) (discussing the political and social
difficulties in class action litigation).
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constrained power to realize their own conceptions of the public
good.4
A common response to this challenge is that structural reform law-
suits are needed to safeguard the basic civil rights of groups of people
who are prevented by discrimination, poverty, disability, or other fac-
tors from participating fairly and equally in the political process. 5 But
even ardent defenders of structural reform litigation have been wor-
ried about losing sight of the client: "[T]here is an inevitable danger
that the lawyer who sets out to help disadvantaged people as members
of groups may inadvertently succeed in oppressing them . . . as
individuals."6
The goal of this Article is to reach a better understanding of how
lawyers can legitimately represent children in class action litigation.
This understanding is an essential part of the response to broader
challenges to the legitimacy of all structural reform litigation.
Class action litigation involving children, in my view, is a puzzle
within a puzzle. In all class actions, the lawyer must apply ethical
norms premised on a single client with articulated interests to the
amorphous, conflicting, and indeterminate interests of a plaintiff class.
Moreover, the interests of the class as a whole may be more than even
the complex sum of the stated interests of its members, because many
classes include future members. Hence, the lawyer must make judg-
ments as to the "best interests" of the class as a whole and maintain
the role of "representing" the clients while avoiding an offensive de-
gree of paternalism and unbridled attorney power. In litigation in-
volving children, the problem is compounded. The individuals who
make up the plaintiff class themselves have interests that are indeter-
minate in complex ways, and that may differ from their current, stated
preferences.
The solutions that have often been proposed for ethical problems
faced by the individual child's attorney are not of much help to the
attorney representing a class of thousands of children. Conversely,
the various measures proposed to fulfill the lawyer's duty of represen-
tation in class actions cannot straightforwardly be applied to class ac-
tions involving children.
4. Robert H. Mnookin, Test-Case Litigation on Behalf of Children, [hereinafter
Mnookin, Test-Case Litigation] in Interest of Children, supra note 2,2,6; see generally
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L. J. 470 (1976) (analyzing the difficulties
inherent in public interest litigation).
5. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 355 (1988). People
who respond to concerns about client control in class actions by suggesting a ban or
financial constraints on public-interest law practice are really proposing "a ban on
attempts by poor people's lawyers to attack the causes, rather than just the symptoms,
of their clients' troubles." Id.
6. Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va.
L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (1992).
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I will argue that given this compound problem of maintaining a le-
gitimate representational role in children's class action litigation, law-
yers must acknowledge the necessity of making normative judgments
about the best interests of the class, and must explicitly articulate
these judgments. Lawyer's judgments, however, must be guided and
constrained by their duty to use all reasonable methods of communi-
cating and consulting with class members. Moreover, these methods
must be adapted to work with child clients.
Part I discusses the procedural rules and ethical canons currently in
force as they apply to class action litigation and to representation of
children. This part concludes that these rules do not provide a solu-
tion to the attorney's ethical problems, but simply a starting point for
discussion. Part II discusses the ethical issues involved in representing
children, and the potential roles of parents and guardians ad litem.
Part III discusses the ethical issues and conflicts raised by class action
litigation in general, and how these issues are affected by the special
problem of children as class members. Part IV recommends how at-
torneys should approach the ethical problems of representing children
in class action cases.
I. CuRREpNT PROCEDURAL AND ETHIcAL RULES, AND THE NEED
FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE
Although class action litigation has been common for many years,
prevailing legal doctrine, including the procedural rules governing
class actions in federal courts, case law, and ethical standards pro-
posed by the American Bar Association, offer very little guidance to
attorneys. Specifically, the lack of clear standards prevents attorneys
from understanding their ethical duties to represent the members of
the class, resolve conflicts among the interests of class members, or
even conceptualize and determine those interests in the first place.7
Similarly, there is inadequate and conflicting guidance from stat-
utes, ethical rules, and case law for the attorney whose client is a child,
even in simple cases involving a single client.8 One commentator has
aptly stated that the typical child's attorney "essentially muddles
through, trying to be sensitive to the wishes of the client and yet acting
in a manner that the lawyer alone concludes is consistent with the best
interests of the child."9
In addition, structural reform litigation on behalf of poor and mi-
nority clients poses additional ethical questions. "Because of the in-
7. Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 Ohio St.
LJ. 1, 2 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev.
1183, 1191-1202 (1982).
8. Linda L. Long, When the Client is a Child- Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21
J. Fam. L. 607, 610 (1982-83).
9. Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40
Syracuse L. Rev. 709, 759 (1989) (citation omitted).
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herently political character of representing the disadvantaged, the
peculiar vulnerability of those clients, and the absence of ordinary
economic constraints on the attorney-client relationship,"'10 the ethical
duties of lawyers in these cases must differ from those of lawyers rep-
resenting more powerful clients. But the nature of that difference has
not yet been fully articulated by the courts or commentators."
A. Current Procedural Rules and Ethical Standards Regarding
Representation of Children
In creating a procedural mechanism for children to sue, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure establish that children have an independent
right to be plaintiffs in federal litigation, not conditioned on the per-
mission of a parent or other adult.12 Rule 17(c) allows a child or in-
competent person to sue by way of a "general guardian," or if a child
has no such guardian, the court may appoint a "next friend [or] guard-
ian ad litem" or "make such other order as it deems proper for the
protection of the infant."'13 Case law interpreting the rule has re-
quired that the court, in appointing a next friend or guardian ad litem,
be satisfied that the next friend is acting in good faith and in the
child's best interests, and has allowed someone other than the child's
parents or "general guardians" to be appointed as next friends when
they and the child have conflicting interests. 4
Although Rule 17 says nothing about the relationship between an
attorney and a child client, it provides a basic framework, first, by es-
tablishing the child's independent status as a party to litigation, and
second, by introducing the idea of guardians ad litem.
What is the applicability of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct? The relevant ethical canon, Model Rule 1.14, says that attor-
neys must maintain as far as possible a normal attorney-client
relationship with child clients.' Because Model Rule 1.2 defines a
normal attorney-client relationship as one in which the lawyer abides
by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representa-
tion, the attorney thus must allow child clients to control the objec-
tives of the litigation to the extent possible. 6
10. Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level
Bureaucracy, 43 Hastings L.J. 947, 947 (1992) (citation omitted).
11. Id.
12. Fed. R. Civ. -P. 17(c); Lowry, supra note 2, at 273 & n.82; Alison M. Brumley,
Comment, Parental Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 333, 335-39 (1991).
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
14. See Brumley, supra note 12, at 336 & nn.10 & 11 (citing cases).
15. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(a) (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
16. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt.
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Moreover, the Model Rules acknowledge that intermediate degrees
of competence exist so that a child client's ability to direct the litiga-
tion is not an all-or-nothing matter:
When the client is a minor ... maintaining the ordinary client-law-
yer relationship may not be possible in all respects .... Neverthe-
less, a client lacking legal competence often has the ability to
understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters
affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing
extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For
example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly
those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are enti-
tled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody.'
7
Somewhat inconsistently, however, Model Rule 1.14 also provides
that when the attorney believes that child clients cannot "reasonably
act in [their] best interest," he must take "protective action."'18 Thus,
the scope of the lawyer's decision-making power "depends upon the
lawyer's own perception of the client's condition and the client's 'in-
terest.' '9 The drafters of the Rules acknowledge, but do not resolve,
this tension within the Rules.20
Together, Rule 17 and the Model Rules provide a helpful beginning.
They rule out two possible positions: first, that children have no in-
dependent right to act as parties to litigation; and second, that lawyers
for children are simply free to act on their own conception of the
child's best interests, without any duty to consult their clients.2' But
the rules do not explain exactly how, and to what extent, the wishes of
child clients constrain lawyers' actions.
B. Current Procedural Rules and Ethical Standards Regarding
Class Actions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 places a basic, threshold con-
straint on the role of class counsel. Rule 23's provisions on class certi-
fication and approval of settlements do not allow the lawyer simply to
serve as a "private attorney general" independently seeking to enforce
legal rights or promote the public interest. Instead, the rules require
that the lawyer somehow "represent" class members.22 Beyond ruling
out a pure "roving law-enforcer" role, however, the rule offers little
guidance.
17. Id.
18. Id. Rule 1.14(b).
19. ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct 234 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Annotated Model Rules].
20. See id.
21. Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Cli-
ent Relationship, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 259, 279-82 (1995); Martin Guggenheim, The
Right to Be Represented but Not Heard. Reflections on Legal Representation for Chil-
dren, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 81-82 (1984); Long, supra note 8, at 612, 619.
22. Morawetz, supra note 7, at 3 & n.8; Garth, supra note 3, at 503.
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Rule 23 leaves unanswered crucial questions about class counsel's
proper role and duties to the class. The rule fails to articulate a model
that makes class action lawyers accountable to class members without
imposing unrealistic limitations on the lawyer's ability to act. The rule
further fails to account for both the views of class members and the
public interest in law enforcement. It also fails to delineate clearly the
respective decision-making roles of class counsel, named plaintiffs,
and the class members as a whole. 3
Why is Rule 23 so cryptic and inadequate on these essential issues?
An answer may be found in the long and complex history of class
action litigation, and in the ongoing search for assurance of its legiti-
macy. Yeazell's historical study of class actions leads him to conclude
that Rule 23, "by incorporating several conflicting theories into a sin-
gle rule . . . arrived at a procedural replication of a deeper uncer-
tainty. '24 One strand of theory regards a class action as a consensual
alliance of individuals, each of whom sees the goals of the class action
as consistent with her self-interest.25 Another view of the class action
regards the attorney and named plaintiffs as "enlightened trustees"
who pursue the best interests of the class as a whole. These interests,
however, may differ from the expressed preferences of the class
members2 6
The current Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not resolve
the confusion over the lawyer's role left in the wake of Rule 23, be-
cause no ethical rules discuss class actions. The Model Rules gener-
ally assume the presence of an individual client, able to articulate her
own interests and make key litigation decisions.2 7 Moreover, the
Model Rules make things worse by creating the false impression that
the class lawyer must have a typical client-lawyer relationship with
every member of the class.'
This conclusion is strikingly parallel to the one reached above re-
garding the ethical constraints the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Model Rules impose on the child's attorney. In both cases,
the applicable rules are not entirely clear. This lack of clarity is rooted
in deep tensions regarding the nature and legitimacy of "representa-
tion" of a child or a class. A child's stated preferences may differ from
her best interests; class members' preferences may differ from the best
interests of the class as a whole. In both cases, there is a tension be-
tween a view of the attorney as "delegate" carrying out clients' wishes,
and as "trustee" of the clients' interests.29 Finally, in both cases, the
23. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 733-37; see Garth, supra note 3, at 493.
24. Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class Ac-
tion 238 (1987).
25. Id. at 251.
26. Id.
27. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 717-18.
28. See id. at 775-76.
29. See id. at 781-87.
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simplest answer is ruled out. The attorney is not just let loose to act
on her own view of the class's or child's best interest. But the rules
fail to provide guidance on exactly how the class members' or child's
views should be solicited, and to what extent these views should con-
trol the lawyer's actions.
II. CHILDREN As CLIENTS IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A. The Problem of Incapacity
Young children often cannot state their own needs and desires.3 °
Older children may be able to articulate their desires, but their desires
may not be accepted as authoritative in dictating the actions of their
counsel. Moreover, most structural reform cases on behalf of children
involve poor and minority children, where parents and communities
may also be unable to serve as a check on attorney power.31 At the
same time, children usually cannot participate directly in the political
process by voting, lobbying, organizing, or influencing the administra-
tors of public agencies.
On one hand, arguments for the legitimacy of judicial intervention
are especially strong in structural reform cases involving children be-
cause children are uniquely powerless and their needs are especially
compelling. 2 On the other hand, children are vulnerable to having
their individual interests sacrificed to the broader goals of class coun-
sel.33 Adults typically have some opportunity to express their views to
class counsel, protest when counsel acts against these views, talk to the
media, and influence the organizations (such as the NAACP and the
Sierra Club) that purport to litigate on their behalf.
The school desegregation cases are classic examples of both the jus-
tification for, and the troubling issues concerning, class action litiga-
tion on behalf of children:
On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the in-
terests of children received less protection from ordinary political
channels. Black children, even with parental involvement, lacked
the political power to force states and local districts to desegregate
schools. However, the children on whose behalf suit was brought
exerted no influence or control over the litigation .... 34
The same problem can be seen in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform,35 ("OFFER") a class action brought
to establish the due process right of foster children to notice and a
30. Mnookin, Test-Case Litigation, supra note 4, at 4.
31. Robert H. Mnookin, Final Observations, in Interest of Children, supra note 2,
at 509, 515-16.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Mnookin, Test-Case Litigation, supra note 4, at 8.
35. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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hearing before being moved from one foster placement to another.
Class counsel, who represented both foster parents and foster chil-
dren, did not speak to any child clients, or consult with any experts on
child welfare or child development, before seeking preliminary injunc-
tive relief.36 When separate counsel was later appointed for the chil-
dren, she also did not interview any of the children, or any experts on
child development, but simply advocated for the result she thought
was in their best interests-which directly opposed her predecessor's
view.37
These cases suggest an obvious challenge to the legitimacy of coun-
sel's representation of child clients. What assurance can there be that
an advocate who claims to speak for the interests of children is not
simply pressing for her own political preferences, unconstrained by
any client involvement?38 Guggenheim has stated this challenge most
compellingly: "When lawyers are assigned to speak for children, we
are assured only that another adult will be heard; with the class and
cultural differences that separate many lawyers from their clients,
what the lawyer has to say frequently tells us nothing about what the
child wants or needs. 39 Guggenheim concludes that appointment of
counsel for children creates a misleading and unhelpful illusion of rep-
resentation and should be dispensed with.40 He does not, however,
provide a solution applicable to structural reform litigation on behalf
of children, unless such litigation is to be abandoned entirely.
B. The Role of Parents
A possible response to the concerns about the legitimacy of attor-
neys' representation of children is for the attorney to take direction
from the child's parents or guardians. One of the basic ways in which
children differ from adults is that, in legal status as well as everyday
life, they are generally in the custody of a parent, or someone standing
in the place of a parent (a relative, grandparent, or government
agency).
Some commentators have argued that decision-making responsibil-
ity for children involved in litigation should rest with the parents un-
less a judicial or administrative finding of unfitness disqualifies them
from this role.4' This view rests on the longstanding body of law re-
36. David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, Smith v. Offer, in Interest of Children,
supra note 2, 67, 82-83.
37. Id. at 91-94.
38. Mnookin, Defining the Questions, supra note 2, at 43.
39. Guggenheim, supra note 21, at 154-55.
40. Id. at 147.
41. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child 111-12
(1979) (arguing that parents should be presumed to look after the best interests of
their children, including the children's need for legal assistance, unless judicially dis-
qualified, and that this presumption is necessary to preserve the value of family integ-
rity and parental autonomy).
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garding children as incompetent to make legally binding decisions
(such as consenting to medical care or entering into contracts), and
the equally longstanding legal power of parents to make such deci-
sions for their children.
On this view, parents are a "natural" proxy for children in class ac-
tion litigation, so that class actions involving children present no spe-
cial ethical issues. This view fails, however, for two reasons. First,
children have an independent status as legal persons, and have some
rights, such as constitutional privacy rights, that are theirs alone to
exercise, even against the wishes of their parents or guardians. Ac-
cordingly, they should have at least some right to legal representation
free from parental control of litigation decisions. Second, because
parents' interests may conflict with their children's, parents may fail to
diligently pursue their children's interests in litigation.42
On the other hand, parents' views cannot simply be disregarded.
They are often in the best position to articulate the needs and interests
of their children. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,43 a
federal class action of almost legendary duration and complexity,
aptly illustrates the problem.' The case was brought to challenge
conditions in a state institution for severely retarded children. The
ultimate goal of the children's lawyer was to close down the institution
and establish community placements and services for these children.45
After a remedial order was issued, some parents expressed opposition
to closing the institution.46 The lawyer took the position that these
parents had conflicts of interest with their children, and their opposi-
tion should be disregarded by the court.47
But the dissident parents' opposition to closing the institution and
moving all children into community-based placements may have had
various sources. First, the parents may have had good reasons,
grounded in bitter experience with state bureaucracies, to distrust the
state officials' plan to dismantle the only available place where their
children could safely live and receive minimal care, and then to de-
velop alternative community placements-which might never materi-
42. See Mnookin, Final Observations, supra note 31, at 509, 512; Ventrell, supra
note 21, at 277; Rhode, supra note 7, at 1221-22. Mnookin notes that there are also
reasons to doubt whether parents are adequate spokespersons for their children in the
broader political arena. Parents may fail to participate in political decisions that af-
fect children because the payoff to their own children is too diffuse. Parents also may
see other people's children as competitors for scarce social resources, so that parent
groups "tend to split into self-protective factions." Mnookin, Defining the Questions,
supra note 2, at 39.
43. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
44. See Robert A. Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in Interest of Children, supra note
2, 265, 266-67.
45. See id. at 268-70 (discussing the "deinstitutionalization" movement).
46. Id. at 275-76.
47. See id at 278 (stating that parents opposed the closing of the institution simply
to avoid the embarrassment of having their disabled children live in their community).
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alize.48 Second, some parents might have genuinely believed that a
highly restrictive, hospital-type setting was the only one in which their
children could receive adequate care.4 9 On the other hand, some par-
ents may have opposed deinstitutionalization because it would place
hardships on themselves and other family members.5 0 A successful
community placement might generate guilt about the prior years of
institutionalization. 51 Or, simply living in the same community with
their severely disabled child might cause emotional pain to the par-
ents, and embarrassment and ostracism to the child's siblings.
52
Similarly, in Roe v. Norton,5 3 the plaintiffs sought to invalidate a
requirement that mothers cooperate with state officials in establishing
the paternity of their children when applying for AFDC benefits. This
position could be seen as "pro-mother, pro-child or a murky combina-
tion of both."54 In some cases, forced cooperation would hurt both
the child and the mother, for example where the mother had success-
fully concealed her whereabouts from an abusive and violent father,
or where bureaucratic misuse of the power to demand cooperation
would result in cutting off benefits.55 In other cases, forced coopera-
tion would embarrass the mother and invade her privacy, but arguably
help the child by creating the basis for a father-child relationship.
5 6
Hence, a litigation strategy designed to eliminate all pressure on
mothers to establish paternity may or may not have been congruent
with the children's interests.
As these cases illustrate, the child's lawyer can neither simply ac-
cept parents as authoritative spokespersons for their children's inter-
ests, nor dismiss their views as irrelevant to the determination of the
children's interests. Parents-and in many cases, competing groups of
parents with different views-are yet another set of voices the lawyer
must listen to, evaluate, and factor into the determination of the chil-
dren's interests.
C. The Role of Guardians Ad Litem
All the issues discussed above regarding parents also apply to
guardians ad litem or "next friends" appointed by the court under
Rule 17(c).5 7 The lawyer's duty to evaluate independently the guard-
48. See id. at 276.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 278.
51. See id. at 287-88.
52. All these concerns are evident from various submissions of dissenting parents
in the Pennhurst case. Id. at 275-77, 285.
53. 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
54. Stephen D. Sugarman, Roe v. Norton: Coerced Maternal Cooperation, in In-
terest of Children, supra note 2, at 365, 388.
55. See id. at 388-90.
56. Id.
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
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ian's views of the child's interests is not eliminated simply because a
parent or other adult has been dignified with this official role.
When a guardian represents a child (or incompetent adult), the
commentators to the Model Rules point out that "the lawyer should
as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client,
particularly in maintaining communication. ' 8 But the annotations to
Rule 1.14 point out that even though "the lawyer must generally abide
by the guardian's decisions[,] ... if the lawyer believes that the guard-
ian is acting contrary to the ward's best interests, the lawyer's author-
ity to take 'protective action' may come into play."59 The annotations
cite cases where lawyers have sought replacement of the guardian,
sought judicial resolution of a dispute between the lawyer and the
guardian, or refused to withdraw when a guardian with suspect mo-
tives "fired" the lawyer.6° Thus, appointment of a parent or other
adult as guardian ad litem does not absolve the attorney of the duty to
make an independent determination of the client's interests. 61 In-
deed, the utility of Rule 17(c) is unclear, because counsel must inde-
pendently evaluate the interests of the children, and cannot treat the
guardians' directives as controlling.
II. ETHICAL ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A. Class Actions and the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Class action litigation, even if all class members are competent
adults, raises troubling issues about the role of the lawyer representing
the class. There is no single client with clearly identifiable views, but
"an aggregation of litigants with unstable, inchoate, or conflicting
preferences. The more diffuse and divided the class, the greater the
problem of defining its objectives. '62
58. Model Rules, supra note 15, Rule 1.14 cnt.
59. Annotated Model Rules, supra note 19, at 248-49.
60. Id.
61. Even an apparently irreproachable choice of guardian may raise the potential
for conflicts of interest. For example, in Willie M. v. Hunt, 732 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.
1984), another institutional reform case, the director of the state Protection & Advo-
cacy program, Albert Singer, served as next friend for the named plaintiffs, who were
children living in a mental institution. Soler & Warboys, supra note 2, at 71. He would
appear to be the perfect guardian, an expert in* the substantive issues, deeply commit-
ted to the interests of persons with mental disabilities, yet without a personal stake in
the litigation.
When the guardian, however, is affiliated with an organization involved in the liti-
gation, potential conflicts between the interests of advocacy organizations and those
of class members may arise. Here, the guardian's employer, the Protection & Advo-
cacy office, helped finance the case. l
62. Mnookin, Defining the Questions, supra note 2, at 52 (quoting Rhode, supra
note 7, at 1183); see Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the
Class Action Lawyer, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 385, 389 (1987); infra notes 72-74 and accompa-
nying text.
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Moreover, class counsel's duty to represent all class members leads
to numerous potential conflicts of interest among the lawyers, the
named class representatives, and the unnamed class members.63
These conflicts are heightened when combined with the complex and
protracted character of structural reform litigation. In addition, the
subject matter of the litigation often involves class members' most
fundamental rights and needs.' 4
Some class members may initially oppose litigation, preferring the
status quo to the risks associated with change. For example, institu-
tionalized youth may be fearful of staff retaliation if they participate
in a lawsuit challenging conditions at an institution.6 As the litigation
develops, alternative strategies and remedies may be favored by dif-
ferent constituencies within the plaintiff class. 6
These problems cannot be avoided by deferring to the named plain-
tiffs or, in children's cases, the named plaintiffs' guardians ad litem, to
articulate the interests of the class, and resolve intraclass conflicts.
Named plaintiffs often have neither the ability nor the motivation to
synthesize the full range of interests and views held by class members,
and direct counsel accordingly. 67 Courts have recognized the limited
authority of named plaintiffs, and lawyers have been permitted to defy
their directives by asserting that the named plaintiffs are not truly
speaking for the interests of the class. 68 One commentator has even
doubted that the role of named plaintiffs is helpful at all, suggesting
that they may "simply add a layer to the decision-making machinery
and.., push the class clients even further away from those who will
make decisions for them."
69
The problem of diverging interests within the class is compounded
by class counsel's own interests.7 ° Sometimes class counsel have ob-
vious conflicts. For example, counsel may favor a quicker remedy be-
cause they are bearing the costs of litigation, or when a proffered
agreement on attorneys' fees is tied to substantive relief.71 More sub-
tle conflicts occur because counsel may consider the current litigation
as only part of an ongoing strategy of law reform or social change, or
63. Kane, supra note 62, at 394-95.
64. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1187.
65. Id. at 1188 n.16.
66. I& at 1188-91.
67. Id at 1202-03. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 760-61.
68. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1203-04.
69. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 760-61.
70. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1191.
71. Id. at 1206-10. This problem is compounded by Supreme Court case law hold-
ing that plaintiffs' counsel in civil rights cases can be forced to negotiate a settlement
regarding fees and substantive relief simultaneously, so that their ethical duty to their
clients could compel them to accept a favorable settlement with no provision for any
attorneys' fees. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-733 (1986); Kane, supra note 62, at
395 & n.61.
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both, and the success of that long term strategy may conflict with the
more immediate interests of the class members.72
Moreover, the relationship between the lawyer and class members
in structural reform cases is often mediated by an organization. This
organization is often the attorney's employer or source of funding,
such as the NAACP, ACLU, or the national legal services support
centers.73 Attorneys must be especially vigilant to avoid stifling or
ignoring the voices of dissident clients when their organizational em-
ployer has interests that may diverge from those of the clients.74
Finally, the class is more than even the very complex sum of its
current members' preferences.75 Most plaintiff classes in structural re-
form cases are defined to include future members. Thus, any determi-
nation of the interests of the class must factor in the interests of
"future generations," which may differ from the interests of current
class members.76 For example, a settlement in an institutional reform
case may trade off relief for past unlawful practices to gain prospec-
tive changes in institutional policy and practice, benefitting future
class members over class members who have suffered past harms. 77
For all of these reasons, several commentators have found that cli-
ent control of litigation is neither practically feasible, nor ethically de-
sirable in many class action cases, and have concluded that lawyers
must act as "trustees" for the best interests of the class:
Since there is no one to consult, because no one represents the en-
tire class (including future generations), the ideal of representative-
ness cannot require that [class lawyers] consult someone. They are
thrown back by default on their own judgment.
72. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1209-10.
73. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4, at 489-93 (discussing the importance of civil rights
organizations in civil rights litigation).
74. Id. at 490-91 (criticizing the lawyers in desegregation cases for being answer-
able only to a minuscule constituency, the leadership and financial supporters of the
NAACP, while serving a massive clientele). Justice Harlan prophetically worried that
"the totality of the separate interests of the members and others whose causes the
petitioner champions ... may far exceed in scope and variety that body's views of
policy, as embodied in litigating strategy and tactics." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 462 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded that the attorneys
could not give potentially dissident parents "that undivided allegiance that is the hall-
mark of the attorney-client relation." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
75. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1185.
76. Luban, supra note 5, at 347. Moreover, some commentators have argued that
public interest lawyers must look even farther than the interests of future class mem-
bers, to the interests of the class members' community as a whole. See Paul R. Trem-
blay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. Rev.
1101, 1141-43 (1990).
77. Kane, supra note 62, at 396.
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Why the lawyers? Simply because they are the ones faced with a
decision that they cannot abdicate.78
To guide the class lawyer, Luban sets out four possible kinds of class
representation: direct delegation, indirect delegation, interest repre-
sentation, and best-world representation.79 Direct delegation has the
lawyer canvass all class members and act on their actual wishes, which
is possible only where the class is small, compact, and unified.80 Indi-
rect delegation requires the lawyer to act on the wishes of certain class
members who are chosen democratically by the class as a whole,
which is possible when the class is mobilized and able to choose repre-
sentatives.81 Interest representation requires the lawyer to take direc-
tion from a group of class members chosen by the lawyer as
representative of the class's interests.8 Finally, in best-world repre-
sentation, the lawyer acts as a trustee to create the "best possible
world" for present and future members of the client class, as a last
resort when no other kind of representation is feasible.83 Luban ex-
plains that "each succeeding form marks a falling away from the
ideal"'  of direct representation of clients' interests, in that progres-
sively more decision-making discretion is transferred to the attorney,
and the "will of the constituents becomes progressively more conjec-
tural."85 He concludes, however, that any of these forms of represen-
tation may be consistent with that ideal if no more direct form of
representation is possible.86 Thus, when class action attorneys fall
back on their own views to determine the interests of the class, they
are not necessarily acting unethically or usurping their clients' proper
role, if what Luban calls "best-world representation" is the only form
of representation possible in the circumstances.8s
This conclusion may be comforting to some class action lawyers, in
that it seems to give permission to act an as "enlightened trustee" of
the class's best interests. But it is important to keep in mind that
Luban and other commentators apply this conclusion only in situa-
78. Luban, supra note 5, at 348-49; see also Kane, supra note 62, at 389 (noting
that class action attorneys make decisions normally reserved to the client).
79. Luban, supra note 5, at 351-52.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. ME
84. Id. at 352.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 351-52.
87. Id. at 353; see also Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 941 (1986) (ar-
guing that because requiring full client autonomy would make public interest repre-
sentation impossible, class lawyers should be allowed "to make critical decisions
themselves... by honestly consulting their own best conception of what public inter-
est dictates"); Kane, supra note 62, at 394 (arguing that "it is not necessary or realistic
in class suits to obtain authorization to make many decisions, which in ordinary two-
party litigation are made only after client consultation").
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tions where no more direct form of representation, and no greater
degree of client participation, are possible. There may be various
measures applicable to structural reform litigation on behalf of chil-
dren that make it unnecessary to revert to complete lawyer
trusteeship.
B. Ethical Issues Concerning Remedies in Class Action Cases
Remedies issues arising in structural reform class actions create ad-
ditional ethical problems. In most structural reform litigation, the
legal norms that determine questions of liability do not dictate the
content of the remedy. The liability norms in such litigation consist of
generally articulated, aspirational standards (such as constitutional
doctrines) that must be implemented in the specific context of each
case.8 8 Traditional legal processes are inadequate to fill this gap be-
tween right and remedy; the choice of remedy involves essentially
political and administrative questions of effectiveness and
practicability.
This indeterminacy of remedies makes conflict within the plaintiff
class especially likely. Because there is "no obvious single solution
flowing ineluctably from the nature of the violation, '8 9 different class
members may favor different remedies,90 all of which are within the
range of remedies permitted by the applicable legal norms.
Class action litigation often has "legislative" results in the form of
court orders or consent decrees restructuring public institutions by
mandating detailed procedures and policies. But these mandates are
not developed by the usual legislative or administrative decision-mak-
ing processes, with input from the various groups whose interests may
be affected by the change. Because the remedy is determined by the
preferences of class counsel, class members, and the judge, it "triggers
questions about whether countermajoritarian bodies ought to be grap-
pling with these cases in the first instance." 91
Hence, counsel must find a way to oversee the choice of remedies
that takes account of both the actual views of class members and the
interests of the class as a whole-all the while bearing in mind the
need to defend the remedy against potential charges of illegitimately
usurping legislative or administrative functions.
For this reason, one commentator on structural reform cases on be-
half of children has concluded that "[c]onstitutional litigation is a poor
way to make public policy about issues when knowledge is limited and
88. Robert D. Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the
Burger Court, 13 Harv. C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1978); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative
Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. LJ. 1355, 1377 (1991).
89. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1184.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1242.
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when there is no consensus on underlying values."' ' -But, the author
goes on to ask, a "poor way" compared to what? The majoritarian
political process also does not often result in decisions that take full
account of the rights and needs of children, especially poor and minor-
ity children. Remedies achieved through class action litigation may
be, to paraphrase the old saying about democracy, the worst way of
reforming public institutions, except for all the others.
9 3
In some structural reform cases, however, none of the range of pos-
sible remedies may genuinely respond to the class members' substan-
tive interests. For example, the central legal issue in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform94 was whether
foster children have a constitutionally protected liberty interest giving
rise to a right to a hearing before being moved from one foster place-
ment to another.95 But the class members' substantive interests may
have only a tenuous relation to such procedural rights as notice, hear-
ings, and appeals. 96
One cause of this problem is that lawyers tend to turn to class action
litigation without considering other kinds of advocacy, and too readily
"convert social struggles into forms like § 1983 litigation, ' 97 without
asking whether litigation rather than some other strategy or combina-
tion of strategies makes more sense.98 Hence, one commentator has
urged that public-interest lawyers have a duty to look beyond litiga-
tion, and to combine litigation with other strategies. 99
C. Ethical Issues Concerning Client Empowerment
The political nature of structural reform litigation has led some
commentators to raise additional ethical concerns about the potential
of the lawyer-client relationship to either contribute to, or undermine,
social and political empowerment of clients. How can class counsel
ensure that the experience of participating in a class action is empow-
ering for class members and does not unintentionally perpetuate their
oppression?
Bell sharply criticizes civil rights lawyers in the school desegregation
cases for making decisions, setting priorities, and undertaking respon-
sibilities that properly belong to clients and their community.100 But
he acknowledges that in many cases "clients are all too willing to turn
92. Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in Interest of Children,
supra note 2, at 149, 264.
93. See id.
94. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
95. hL at 845-47.
96. Id
97. Gerald P. LMpez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life
of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 Geo. L.J 1603, 1603 (1989).
98. Id. at 1610.
99. Id at 1713-15.
100. Bell, supra note 4, at 512.
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everything over to the lawyers."'' Therefore, he argues, the lawyers
must find innovative strategies to organize clients and overcome their
weak economic and political position.10 2
Recent commentators, following up on Bell's early work, have ar-
ticulated a client-empowerment approach often called "rebellious
lawyering.'1 0 3 Such lawyering seeks to remedy three defects in con-
ventional legal practice: the interpersonal domination of clients by
lawyers; the disempowerment that accompanies exclusive reliance on
litigation; and the inefficacy of intra-systemic, nonstructural remedies
to achieve meaningful change.'04 Rebellious lawyering proposes to
address these problems by: restructuring the lawyer-client relation-
ship by emphasizing the "client voice," i.e., increasing client participa-
tion and collaboration; 05 and by a "collectivist" approach to dispute
resolution, focusing on political organizing and coalition-building as
well as litigation.'0 6
101. Id.
102. See id. at 512-13.
103. L6pez has eloquently articulated the basic idea of rebellious lawyering:
[L]awyers must know how to work with, not just on behalf of, subordinated
people. They must know how to collaborate with other professional and lay
allies.... They must understand how to educate those with whom they work
both about law and about professional lawyering .... And, at least as impor-
tantly, they must open themselves to being educated by the subordinated
and their allies about the traditions and experiences of subordinated life.
To move in these directions, those operating in the rebellious idea of law-
yering must situate their work in the lives and in the communities of the
subordinated themselves.... In short, the rebellious idea of lawyering de-
mands that lawyers ... nurture sensibilities and skills compatible with a col-
lective fight for social change.
LUpez, supra note 97, at 1608. A similar vision has been articulated by White's explo-
ration of litigation as an occasion for the education and mobilization of clients, by
giving voice to injuries and hopes, focusing clients' attention on shared problems and
goals for change, and giving them the incentive and energy to produce other types of
political action (such as demonstrations, public meetings, or political theater). Thus,
litigation can become a community event, part of a larger political strategy, and
processes such as evidence-gathering, hearings, publicity, and settlement negotiations
can serve as vehicles for client education and empowerment. See generally Lucie E.
White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit" Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 535 (1987-88) (discussing how welfare litiga-
tion can empower disadvantaged clients).
104. Tremblay, supra note 10, at 952.
105. This does not, however, mean taking the client's views as immutable: The law-
yer should "gently challenge" the client's understanding of the problems and potential
solutions, and, while respecting the client's knowledge of and hopes for his situation,
encourage him to "explore alternative versions of what is going on and what would
constitute an improvement." L6pez, supra note 97, at 1613.
106. Tremblay, supra note 10, at 952-53. Proponents of "client-centered lawyering"
have reached similar conclusions, from a less overtly political perspective, about the
importance of the "client voice," and avoiding interpersonal domination of clients.
See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 6, at 1112. ("[T]he ways that clients describe themselves
are inevitably influenced by the questions they are asked, and the desires clients artic-
ulate are affected by the sense of the possible that lawyers provide.").
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It is not clear whether the ideals of rebellious lawyering can be ap-
plied to class action litigation involving children. The most obvious
objection is that political mobilization is not a realistic goal for a class
of children. But this objection can be answered; promoting political
empowerment does make sense for older adolescents, and for family
members and communities acting on behalf of younger children. The
more serious problem is that the class action structure itself is prob-
lematic for the goal of client empowerment. While class action status
may empower groups of people by facilitating their access to court, it
may not empower them vis-a-vis their own lawyers, because, as dis-
cussed above, the complex and potentially conflicting nature of the
interests of class members prevent the class from directing the law-
yer's actions, and ultimately place the responsibility for acting on the
class's best interests in the lawyer's hands.10 7
Trying to apply the idea of "rebellious lawyering" to the class action
context recalls the problem, posed by Luban, that protecting the inter-
ests of future class members leads to paternalistic trusteeship by class
counsel.'08 Because rebellious lawyering focuses on long term polit-
ical and social change, it often requires clients to forego short-term
solutions to their immediate problems. 0 9 In an individual lawyer-cli-
ent relationship, this problem could be resolved by asking whether the
client consents, after a full discussion of all the alternatives, to a "re-
bellious" strategy. But when a decision between addressing immedi-
ate needs through non-structural remedies and pursuing structural
reform must be made for a large class of clients, it is difficult to pro-
tect future interests and yet retain a client-centered decision-making
process.110 This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that "rebellious-
ness may need to be imposed from above.""'
Thus, the children's class action lawyer who seeks to incorporate
"rebelliousness" into her ethical role re-encounters, in an especially
ironic form, the tension between client autonomy and empowerment,
and the same pull towards paternalistic trusteeship of class interests
that rebellious lawyering seeks to avoid.
D. Ethical Issues Concerning Priorities for Advocacy
Some commentators have proposed extending the class action at-
torney's ethical responsibility to issues arising even before an attor-
ney-client relationship has been created-to the choice of where to
target advocacy resources. How should the attorney determine that a
107. Ellman, supra note 6, at 1118-19.
108. Luban, supra note 5, at 343.
109. Tremblay, supra note 10, at 954-59.
110. Id. at 959.
111. Id. at 967.
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particular case addresses the most important legal problems faced by
the client community, or that it is at least a good place to start?" 2
Chambers and Wald recommend a "broad consultation process" in
choosing which kinds of structural reform cases to bring on behalf of
children." 3 More generally, writers on legal ethics have pointed out
that the prevailing approaches to legal ethics have failed to address
the problem of ensuring an appropriate distribution of the scarce re-
sources of public-interest legal advocacy." 4 One commentator has
proposed that, "[i]n deciding whether to commit herself to [a set of
legal] claims and goals, a lawyer should assess their merits in relation
to the merits of the claims and goals of others whom she might
serve."" 5 Therefore, a lawyer may formulate her assessment accord-
ing to various criteria, including: the relative legal merit of the claims,
"the importance of the interests involved, and the extent to which the
representation would contribute to the equalization of access to the
legal system.""' 6
E. Examples of Ethical Problems in Children's Class Action
Litigation
It may be helpful to examine in more detail some examples of how
these ethical problems have arisen in structural reform cases brought
on behalf of children. The litigation that first gave rise to the current
debate over the lawyer-cliefnt relationship in class actions is the school
desegregation cases. 1 7 In these cases, potential plaintiffs (Black par-
ents and their children) were generally told at the outset that the at-
torneys, and the NAACP for which they worked, would direct the
course of litigation towards achieving integration." 8 Specifically, the
attorneys warned that they would not settle for improvements in the
quality of segregated schools, even if class members favored this rem-
edy." 9 Initially, clients may have accepted such strategic constraints,
especially because they generally did not have a choice of counsel.
The litigation, however, spanned many years. How should the lawyers
have responded when some parents and children later started to dis-
112. See Chambers & Wald, supra note 36, at 132-33 (criticizing counsel in OFFER
for not having a "well-formulated theory of child development or children's needs to
serve as a backdrop for decision making about cases to file").
113. Id. at 134.
114. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083,
1093 (1988).
115. Id
116. Id.
117. See generally Bell, supra note 4 (describing strategies and theories employed in
early desegregation cases and the ethical dilemmas such cases produced within the
attorney-client relationship).
118. I& at 476.
119. See id.
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agree sharply with counsel's strategy, and became disillusioned with
the goal of integration and more concerned with educational quality?
Bell has critically noted that "court orders mandating racial balance
may be (depending on the circumstances) educationally advanta-
geous, irrelevant, or even disadvantageous. Nevertheless, civil rights
lawyers continue to argue that black children are entitled to inte-
grated schools without regard to the educational effect of such assign-
ments." 120 Bell has urged that this kind of conflict among lawyers and
class members must be faced and resolved, because either dissident
clients will sabotage the litigation, or attorneys will be in the untena-
ble position of imposing a legal strategy over the opposition of their
clients.' 21
Moreover, by sacrificing client dissent to the cause of the lawsuit,
the cause itself may be lost. Bell argues that the NAACP's single-minded pursuit of integration remedies and their refusal to listen to
the concerns of black parents about educational quality, compromised
the effectiveness of the litigation:
[R]emedies that fail to attack all policies of racial subordination al-
most guarantee that the basic evil of segregated schools will survive
and flourish ....
... Much more effective remedies for racial subordination in the
schools could be obtained if the creative energies of the civil rights
litigation groups could be brought into line with the needs and
desires of their clients.
122
Another classic example of the dire effects of conflict in a structural
reform class action is Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospi-
tal.123 In Pennhurst, plaintiffs' counsel initially ignored a potential
conflict between the interest of parents who had placed their children
at the institution, often reluctantly after all alternatives failed, and the
children's presumed interest in closing the institution. 24 When coun-
sel amended the complaint to request closure of Pennhurst, a bitter
dispute developed over whether the parents of the named plaintiffs
had known about and acquiesced to this change, or had been misled
by counsel.'2
When this conflict finally came into the open, counsel took the posi-
tion that his true clients were the children in the institution, and he
would continue pursuing his own vision of their rights and interests,
over the objections of dissident parents.'26 Thus, counsel's position
120. Id. at 480.
121. Bell documents several instances of open and hostile confrontations between
the NAACP and dissident black parents. Il at 485-87.
122. Id. at 488.
123. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see Burt, supra note 44, at 266-67, 288-89.
124. Burt, supra note 44, at 285.
125. Id. at 285-86.
126. Id.
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was that he alone had the power to determine the children's interests
and act on them. Although this may have been an ethically defensible
position, it came as a shock to the children's parents.
One commentator noted a general tendency, throughout the Pen-
nhurst litigation, for all the parties and amici involved, including indi-
vidual parents, parents' organizations, defendant state officials, and
even two federal agencies that appeared as amici, to initially "over-
state their mutuality and correspondingly to suppress their expression
or even awareness of divergence" in their views of what should be
done for the plaintiff children. 27 The true divergence of interests and
views only became evident as the litigation process unfolded, leading
to substantial delay and disruption.128
It might have been better to candidly acknowledge, in a case such as
Pennhurst, that any possible remedy would benefit some children and
hurt others.' 29 One commentator has criticized children's advocates
for masking tensions among the interests of the plaintiff children by
claiming a unitary "child-centered" position, 30 when what the advo-
cates were really doing was choosing among alternative remedies, and
thus favoring some children over others, on the basis of other values,
such as an overall goal of empowering poor people politically and re-
ducing economic inequities.13 '
Thus, these few examples highlight the problems discussed above:
inability of child clients to define their own interests; conflict over the
proper role of parents; conflicts of interest among class members,
plaintiffs' counsel, and counsel's organizational employer; issues con-
cerning the indeterminacy and consequent need for choice among
remedies and the inadequacy of remedies to address the full range of
class members' needs; issues of client empowerment (or disempower-
ment); and questions of the proper allocation of the scarce resource of
public-interest advocacy.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
CHILDREN'S CLASS-ACrION LITIGATION
Before turning to specific recommendations for addressing the
problems discussed above, a caveat is in order. It is important, while
seeking to provide better ethical guidance to the children's class ac-
tion lawyer, not to erect a rigid and unrealistic edifice of ethical and
127. Id. at 324.
128. See Rhode, supra note 7, at 1214 (noting that class interests and views can shift
dramatically over the protracted course of reform litigation); cf. Burt, supra note 44,
at 325.
129. See Sugarman, supra note 54, at 446 (providing examples of ways that striking
down the requirement of maternal cooperation in paternity establishment and child-
support collection may harm some of the children on whose behalf Roe v. Norton was
brought, and might harm poor people generally).
130. Id. at 447.
131. See id. at 446-47.
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procedural rules that "no one wants to inhabit." '132 Various commen-
tators, on both class action lawyering and lawyering for children, sur-
prisingly conclude with a defense of "muddling through." For
instance, Long finds that there may be no single, definable "role" that
solves the ethical problems confronting the child's attorney, and that
the "style of advocacy best for the client's interests depends more on
the particularities of the situation than on self-limiting role percep-
tions." '133 Grosberg makes an explicit parallel between the child's at-
torney, who tries to be respectful and responsive to the child-client's
wishes but ultimately makes the decisions she thinks are in the child's
best interests, with the lawyer representing a class."3 This "less neat
and multifaceted" behavioral norm, Grosberg concludes, is actually
the "most appropriate model" for both the children's lawyer and the
class action lawyer (and presumably also for the children's class action
lawyer).135
This may not be an unprincipled retreat from rigorous ethical analy-
sis. Some writers on legal ethics have argued against an overly rigid
and formal approach, drawing on well-known work on judicial deci-
sion making.1 36 Moreover, there may be pragmatic reasons for not
overly constraining the children's class action attorney with ethical
and procedural rules. Even well-intentioned and carefully drawn
standards may hinder the already difficult endeavor of structural re-
form litigation, and reduce the effectiveness of the class action device
in vindicating civil rights. 37 Without creating overly rigid rules, how-
ever, some useful guidelines can be articulated.
A. Ethical Interaction With Child Clients
Various commentators have recommended that advocates work to-
ward empowering child clients to participate more fully in litigation
decisions affecting their lives, to respect the child client's personal au-
tonomy, unique perspective, and actual decision-making capacities. 38
132. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1245.
133. Long, supra note 8, at 632.
134. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 758.
135. Id. at 761.
136. Simon, supra note 114, at 1090-91. Simon notes that a "complex, flexible"
view of ethical decision making
has been extensively defended against more categorical styles in some of the
best-known literature of judicial decisionmaking ... The preference for cate-
gorical reasoning in the lawyering context reflects nothing more than a fail-
ure to carry through to the lawyering role the critique of formalism,
mechanical jurisprudence, and categorical reasoning that has been applied to
the judicial role throughout this century.
Il
137. See Bell, supra note 4, at 505 (warning that overly stringent rules could also
give defendant officials a weapon to obstruct reform litigation by bringing groundless
disciplinary proceedings against plaintiffs' lawyers).
138. See Sheryl Dicker, Introduction, in Stepping Stones, supra note 2, 1, 7; Long,
supra note 8, at 613.
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Less, however, has been said about exactly how to do this, especially
in the class action context.
One basic starting point is that children's lawyers have an ethical
duty to educate themselves about children before working directly
with child clients. These lawyers should learn enough about child and
adolescent development so as to be able to form reasonable expecta-
tions regarding client participation for children of various ages and to
communicate effectively with clients. Such knowledge would enable
children's lawyers to understand children's limitations without mini-
mizing their abilities.139 Lawyers should also cultivate a sensitivity to
the effects of their own demeanor and communication style on child
clients, and to the substantial differences in maturity, skills, education,
and socioeconomic status that divide lawyers from their child clients.
The child's lawyer has an ethical duty to hvoid using her superior skills
and social position to silence the child's voice, or coerce the child into
passive compliance with the lawyer's views. 140
B. Ethical Interaction With a Class of Children
Even if a lawyer masters the art of communicating with individual
children, this does not solve the problem of how to consult with, and
take direction from, the large, diverse, and unorganized groups of chil-
dren who make up the typical plaintiff class in structural reform
litigation.
Recalling Luban's description of four possible types of class action
representation,' 4 ' it is highly unlikely that a class of children in a
structural reform case will be small and compact enough, and the indi-
vidual members mature and articulate enough, for direct delegation.
Nor will most classes of children be organized, informed, and mature
enough to elect representatives through a genuinely democratic inter-
nal process, as required by the indirect delegation model. The most
feasible model for the children's class action lawyer thus probably in-
volves some combination of interest representation and best-world
representation. Thus, the lawyer should synthesize the expressed
wishes of a number of class members chosen and consulted by the
attorney as representative of the class's interests, with the lawyer's as-
sessment of the best interests of all present and future class members.
It may be tempting for the lawyer to seize immediately upon best-
world representation-to assert that it is ethically permissible simply
to act on her own view of the class's best interests without consulting
any of its members. After all, no matter how many children she talks
to, there will still be the problems of client incapacity or immaturity,
139. Ventrell, supra note 21, at 273, 283-84 (providing a bibliography of recom-
mended reading on child development).
140. Long, supra note 8, at 622 n.52.
141. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 641458
CHILDREN'S CLASS ACTIONS
conflict among class members, and conflict with future class members'
interests. Several commentators, however, have warned lawyers not
to fall back too readily on best-world representation, without fully ex-
ploring the potential for greater client participation. Luban empha-
sizes the lawyer's duty to be "as representative as possible," in -the
circumstances of each case. 42 Grosberg argues that if the class lawyer
cannot possibly consult all class members and must assume ultimate
responsibility for decision making, "it becomes even more critical that
she talks to some."'143
The Model Code's mandate to treat child clients as much as possi-
ble like competent adult clients,' 44 in the context of class action litiga-
tion, should be interpreted as creating a duty to use all feasible means
to communicate with and solicit the views of child clients. 45 This duty
to be as representative as possible by using all reasonable means to
communicate and consult with child clients, and with their parents or
guardians ad litem, provides a crucial, legitimizing constraint on the
lawyer's power. Only by conscientiously fulfilling this duty can the
attorney defend herself-and the whole enterprise of structural re-
form litigation-from serious charges that the lawyer is merely using
the courts to pursue her own political ends.
C. Facilitating Participation of Child Class Members
But how should the children's class action attorney obtain client in-
put? One way to overcome the formidable logistical problems of
communicating with a large and diffuse plaintiff class is to rely on writ-
ten notices, questionnaires, and polls. Bell, for instance, suggests us-
ing notices advising the class of the existence of the suit, the type of
relief to be sought, and the binding nature of the judgment. 46 In de-
segregation cases, he suggests that notices be distributed to each mi-
nority child in the school system with a questionnaire to solicit
parents' views.147 Bell refers, however, only to soliciting the views of
parents-he does not consider whether the notices would be an effec-
tive means of soliciting input from the children.'48
142. Luban, supra note 5, at 351-53.
143. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 729; see id. at 751. Grosberg further proposes a
standard to assess the degree of client input that is ethically required, arguing that the
more intrusive the lawsuit in the class members' daily lives and the more the choice of
litigation strategy and remedies involves "non-legal" (i.e., social, economic, or psycho-
logical) factors, the more client involvement should be required. ld. at 771. By these
criteria, most structural reform litigation would require the lawyer to make vigorous
attempts to ensure client involvement.
144. Model Rules, supra note 15, Rule 1.14.
145. See Bell, supra note 4, at 508 n.124.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. I.
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Commentators have pointed out serious limitations to the degree
and quality of client input that can be obtained by "paper" devices
such as polls and surveys, even in cases involving adult clients.' 49
Although there may be some children's class actions in which these
techniques are feasible and should be used,150 they would rarely, if
ever, fully satisfy the lawyer's duty to communicate with the class
members and involve them in decision making.
Children's class action lawyers should look to the other ways sug-
gested by commentators to overcome the practical and ethical limita-
tions of written notices and surveys. Grosberg proposes that lawyers
use a combination of techniques and that no single method of commu-
nication or set of results should be dispositive. For example, the law-
yer could hold one-on-one interviews with a random sample of class
members, public meetings or hearings at places where class members
live or go to school, or more informal meetings with small groups of
class members, perhaps in combination' with written notices and
surveys.' 51 Thus, lawyers should synthesize various forms of informa-
tion about the class members' views and interests. 52
Named plaintiffs' views are important, but not dispositive, in deter-
mining the interests of the class as a whole. Lawyers should both find
named plaintiffs who are articulate and will stay actively involved
throughout the litigation, and reach out beyond the named plaintiffs
to discern the full range of views held by class members. 53 Similarly,
parents or other adults serving as guardians ad litem for child plaintiffs
are a key source of information about the needs and interests of the
class members, but children's lawyers should also reach out beyond
parents to consult actual class members as much as possible.
149. Client views obtained through these means will often be unrepresentative (be-
cause of low response rates), uninformed, and inadequate to address the kinds of
issues that typically arise in structural reform litigation. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1233.
Only the more highly educated class members may fully understand the notices, and
even their responses may be ill-considered because they have not weighed all the
factual and legal considerations involved in the case. Id. at 1234-35; Kane, supra note
62, at 398 n.80; see Grosberg, supra note 9, at 764. Surveys and polls are necessarily
"majoritarian" techniques of determining class interests; overreliance on such tech-
niques may lead class counsel to disregard valid concerns of a minority of class mem-
bers. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 764. Moreover, these techniques may disregard the
interests of future class members.
150. For instance, these techniques should be used in desegregation cases involving
high school students, where distribution of written materials can readily be achieved
through the school itself, and most students are capable of understanding the issues
and articulating their views.
151. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 768-69 & n.259.
152. Id. at 766; see also Luban, supra note 5, at 346 (arguing that when lawyers
cannot canvass the views of all class members, they should consult with a part of the
class that adequately represents the views and values of the class as a whole); Rhode,
supra note 7, at 1258-60 (using the Pennhurst litigation as an example of how the
degree and quality of client involvement could have been improved at an earlier
stage, thus avoiding later dissension).
153. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 756.
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The subject matter and timing of communications with class mem-
bers should not be limited to a "yes or no" notice when the case is
about to be settled. Indeed, client involvement should begin even
before the class action is filed and should encompass questions about
whether to fie a class action or to pursue other advocacy strategies. If
litigation is to be pursued, clients should have ongoing input on such
issues as whom-to sue and what relief to seek. 54
Finally, children's class action lawyers should draw on the work of
commentators who have sought to apply the values of "client-centered
lawyering" to class representation. Some of these suggestions may be
impossible to apply to large classes of children. But many of the basic
points still apply: the lawyer should take active steps to win clients'
trust, instead of assuming that trust is automatic;155 the lawyer should
help groups of clients identify relevant concerns and discuss them
among themselves; 15 6 and the lawyer 9hould try to resolve disputes
within the client group by using techniques of mediation, but remain
alert to the possibility that the class's interests may be too deeply di-
vided and may need separate representation. 157
D. The Ethical Relevance of Empirical Data
Even with the lawyer's best efforts at effective communication with
the class of child clients, however, for all the reasons surveyed above,
the interests of child clients will often be difficult to determine-some
children are simply too young to articulate their desires, some are dis-
abled, some are articulate but their judgment is questionable, and
some class members (and their parents and other involved adults)
may disagree.
Mnookin's parting advice, at the conclusion of his review of the
complexities and pitfalls of structural reform litigation on behalf of
children, is to "face up to indeterminacy,"'158 and explicitly seek data
on -how alternative strategies and remedies might affect different
groups of children.'59 Moreover, lawyers should bear in mind the
background constraints imposed by the social and political circum-
stances "under which clients must function even if the case is won.'1 60
Past instances of litigation conducted in an empirical vacuum should
serve as a warning. For instance, in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform,'6 ' the trial court focused almost ex-
clusively on the stories of a few named plaintiffs, and the parties never
154. Id at 753-54.
155. Ellman, supra note 6, at 1135-36.
156. Id. at 1139-46.
157. See id. at 1153-59.
158. Mnookin, Final Observations, supra note 31, at 526.
159. Id.
160. Bell, supra note 4, at 513.
161. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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developed and presented to the court information about how the fos-
ter-care system operated as a whole, such as the average number of
moves experienced by foster children, the reasons for these moves,
the psychological and developmental impact on children resulting
from changes in placement, and the average length of stay in foster
care.162 Similarly the lack of data to support key factual assumptions
about the potential effects of alternative policies may make it impossi-
ble to determine whether children truly would gain or lose from the
outcome sought by plaintiffs' counsel.163
The lesson from these cases is that no children's class action attor-
ney should embark on the complex task of sorting out the divergent
and potentially conflicting interests and needs of a class of children
without studying available social-science and developmental literature
on the impact of alternative approaches to the children's situations. 64
What are the effects, separate and combined, of racial integration
and of school quality on Black students? Does- deinstitutionalization
always benefit children with developmental disabilities? What are the
key factors leading to a successful transition from foster care to a per-
manent home? Does forcing mothers to cooperate in establishing pa-
ternity when applying for AFDC lead to domestic violence? Does it
lead to higher rates of economic and emotional involvement from fa-
thers? No responsible advocate should set forth without the benefit of
the insights that social-science literature may have to offer on these
kinds of questions.
E. Ethical Responses to Conflicts of Interest
Even if the children's class action lawyer learns to communicate ef-
fectively with child clients, facilitates client involvement in litigation
through various creative strategies, and uses all available empirical
data to help determine which remedies will best serve her clients' in-
terests, these actions may not be enough. She may still be faced with
conflicts of interest within the class, and between class members and
the various adult players, such as their parents, advocacy organiza-
tions, and the lawyer herself.
1. Disclosure
Criticism of the conduct of children's class action lawyers in past
cases has led to the question whether counsel should be obligated to
depart from their traditional adversary role, for instance, by a height-
ened duty to disclose actual and potential conflicts of interest within
162. Chambers & Wald, supra note 36, at 100-01, 104.
163. Sugarman, supra note 54, at 380.
164. Soler and Warboys praise counsel in the Willie M. litigation for being "espe-
cially careful to consult with experts before making significant legal decisions ....
[T]hey talked to literally dozens of mental health and juvenile justice professionals ...
including many state employees." Soler & Warboys, supra note 2, at 96.
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the class. In Chambers' and Wald's view, the lawyers' adversarial
stances in OFFER meant that "[n]one of the lawyers involved felt any
obligation to put before the judges a rounded view of issues."' 65 They
resisted intervention motions, sought to cut off the fact-finding pro-
cess, and objected to adverse witnesses' testimony.'6 6 Perhaps class
lawyers should be made more responsible for ensuring that the judges
receive a full view of the issues. 67
Similarly, Kane advocates a "partnership between the judge and
class counsel," in which class counsel freely divulges any conflicts of
interest or other representational problems, and uses the court as a
resource to help solve them. 168 Kane argues that the unique features
of structural reform litigation, such as broad-ranging prospective relief
and the potential for costly and time-consuming disruptions if conflicts
emerge belatedly, should motivate lawyers and judges to "shed their
typical postures and enter into a more cooperative partnership.' 1 69
But other commentators have pointed out that this proposed coop-
erative relationship is in tension with the basic functions of lawyers
and judges. It may be hard, if not impossible, for the court to be both
a protector of the class and an impartial adjudicator. It also may be
hard for plaintiffs' lawyers to be both zealous advocates for the class
and "partners" with the court in managing conflicts within the class.' 70
A more modest version of Kane's proposal can readily be adopted.
Because of the powerlessness and incapacity of children as class mem-
bers, counsel should have a special duty to make a record of contacts
with the class and views expressed by (or on behalf of) class members,
and to disclose any emerging conflicts to the court at all stages of the
litigation.' 7 1 Counsel should firmly resist any temptation to hide con-
165. Chambers & Wald, supra note 36, at 141.
166. hL
167. Id. at 146.
168. Kane, supra note 62, at 405 & n.120 (noting that courts have recognized their
special position as guardian of the interests of all class members).
169. Id. at 406. These arguments hark back to Fiss's early proposal that, in struc-
tural reform litigation, judges should "construct a broader representational frame-
work." Fiss, supra note 2, at 26. This would create a court that "tolerates, or even
invites, a multiplicity of spokesmen... each perhaps representing different views as to
what is in the interest of the victim group," so that reform litigation comes to more
closely resemble an administrative hearing process, or even a "town mfeeting," in
which anyone affected by the litigation can have a voice. Id. at 21.
170. Grosberg, supra note 9, at 748 & n.181; see Garth, supra note 3, at 517.
171. Kane, supra note 62, at 403-04 & n.110 (citing Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1015 (1979); Na-
tional Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs v. Mathers, 551 F.2d 340, 346 n.31 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977); League of Martin v. City of Milwaukee,
588 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (E.D. Wis. 1984)); Garth, supra note 3, at 522. The corollary
to this ethical duty is that the judge must have a corresponding duty to work with class
counsel to handle intraclass conflicts without unduly penalizing such disclosure. See
Grosberg, supra note 9, at 771. Courts must communicate to counsel and the class
that "differences of opinion or dissension among class members need not result in the
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flicts from the court-a strong temptation when conflict arises late,
and threatens a hard-won litigation victory or settlement.1
72
Moreover, in contacts with class members, counsel should never sti-
fle or conceal any hints of emerging dissent, but instead should ac-
tively flush it out.173 Counsel should be wary of the potential for any
organization or group involved in the case, such as parents' groups or
guardians ad litem, to overlook or suppress the possibility of conflict
within the class for whom they purport to speak.' 74
For example, the views of the dissident parents in Pennhurst who
opposed closure of the institution were ignored by counsel, and were
not disclosed to the court until after the case was tried and a remedy-
institutional closure-was decreed by the judge.' 75 The belated and
acrimonious emergence of conflict in this case may have been a major
impediment to the overall success of the litigation. Rhode suggests
that the lawyers in Pennhurst should have addressed the concerns of
those objecting to closing the institution promptly and openly, sug-
gested the appointment of separate counsel for the dissenting parents,
and tried to negotiate with the dissenting faction by explaining the
evidence supporting deinstitutionalization. 7 6 Such a course of action
would have prepared families for the possibility of closure, and pro-
vided reassurance that any remedial plan would take account of their
concerns.
1
'
77
Children's class action lawyers may ultimately have to function
more as Burkean trustees1 7 1 than as delegates instructed by their cli-
ents. The trusteeship role, however, should still encompass ethical ob-
ligations to dissenting constituencies within the class. Thus, the lawyer
should have a duty to record all contacts with class members and
adults who purport to speak for them, flush out early indications of
conflict, and disclose conflicts to the court as they emerge. This
would, if nothing else, "narrow [counsel's] capacity for self-delusion
about whose views they were or were not representing.
179
death of a class action," id. at 771, thus avoiding creating disincentives for disclosure
of conflicts. Id. at 786.
172. Complying with this ethical duty may be especially difficult for attorneys
whose livelihood depends on recovering fees under civil rights fee-shifting statutes,
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The temptation to stifle a late-arising conflict that
threatens the class's status as prevailing party must be acknowledged and resisted.
173. Correspondingly, Burt argues that judges in cases like Pennhurst should "ac-
tively solicit[ ] dissent," so that the final resolution reflects a true airing of all compet-
ing interests and viewpoints. Burt, supra note 44, at 328.
174. Id. at 355.
175. See iU. at 314-15.
176. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1259-60.
177. Id. Rhode points out that effectively addressing conflict within the class is not
only an ethical duty, but may be essential to the success of the litigation, because
united parental support of the remedy may be crucial in cases where implementation
is complex, lengthy, and politically controversial. See id. at 1260.
178. Id at 1258.
179. Id.
[Vol. 641464
CHILDREN'S CLASS ACTIONS
2. The Class Certification Process
The class certification process under Rule 23 should be used not as
a routine, mechanical step in litigation. Instead, class counsel should
use the certification process to search out and respond to any emerg-
ing conflicts of interest within the class. Moreover, this process should
not be seen as a one-time occurrence. Lawyers should consider their
initial decisions as to the definition of the class and the use of sub-
classes as tentative and subject to revision if conflicts emerge.
Bell points out that Black parents' concerns about educational qual-
ity and racial integration were "poorly served by the routine approval
of plaintiffs' requests for class status,"' 80 without any attempt to
broaden the representational framework in desegregation cases to re-
flect differing views on remedies within the Black community.' 8' Bell
advocates both a more careful inquiry at the stage of initial class certi-
fication and closer monitoring of class status throughout the
litigation.18s
Bell, Rhode, and other commentators propose several specific
changes that are applicable to children's class actions. They suggest
more thorough hearings on class certification motions.'8 3 They also
suggest consideration of partial class actions, such as authorizing the
case to proceed as a class action only as to certain issues, and the use
of subclasses and intervention motions to deal with later-emerging
conflicts, so as to channel conflict and dissent into a broader represen-
tational framework."8 Rhode criticizes courts' traditional hostility to
belated intervenors and suggests that "courts should make maximum
efforts to accommodate new entrants in some capacity."'8 5
Rhode also suggests more informal means of accommodating di-
verse perspectives within the class. For example, advisory committees
of parents and students should participate in implementing desegrega-
tion remedies.'8 6 Additionally, expert witnesses, special masters, and
magistrates should obtain more detailed information about the views
180. Bell, supra note 4, at 507.
181. See id. at 505-11.
182. Id. at 511.
183. Grosberg suggests that courts should ensure that named plaintiffs have suffi-
cient "knowledge, interest, or experience in the matters being litigated" to serve "in
the useful role of information source or as a watchdog to spur the class lawyer." Gros-
berg, supra note 9, at 737-38. Garth proposes that courts ask "whether all the mem-
bers of the proposed class stand in the same objective position with respect to the
alleged violations of the law"; what is the scope of conflict and dissent within the class;
and whether such conflict is substantial enough to preclude class certification. Garth,
supra note 3, at 523.
184. Bell, supra note 4, at 508-09 & nn.124 & 125; Garth, supra note 3, at 527;
Grosberg, supra note 9, at 745-48, 772-73; Kane, supra note 62, at 400-02; Rhode,
supra note 7, at 1221-22.
185. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1253; see also Garth, supra note 3, at 519 (discussing a
case where a subclass was denied).
186. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1253.
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of class members and give more members of the class a direct par-
ticipatory role in the litigation.1' 7
The goal of these devices is not only to ensure that the court hears
the full range of legal positions within the class, but also that the court
has a complete understanding of the class members' responses to
those positions. The court can use this information to tailor the litiga-
tion process and the remedy to accommodate, as far as possible, the
diversity of views, interests, and circumstances of the children in the
class and the various adults who claim to speak for them.'
88
These devices, however, should be used with caution. An attorney
should weigh the benefits of fuller representation of diverse interest-
groups within the class against the problems created by multiplying
the representational relationships involved in the case. Rhode warns
against "the possibility that greater reliance on separate counsel or
court-appointed experts will simply increase the numbers of platonic
guardians involved in institutional reform litigation."'" 9
When faced with conflicts within the class, the lawyer may be
tempted to abandon the class action device entirely and simply pursue
relief on behalf of an individual child or a few children. In most cases,
however, this would simply exchange the ethical problems posed by
conflicts of interest within the class for another set of equally difficult
ethical problems. First, the lawyer would have to choose how to ap-
portion her time among potential individual plaintiffs. Second,
although the very nature of structural reform litigation, regardless of
its form, generally means that a finding of liability would trigger relief
affecting large numbers of similarly situated children, without the class
action device they would have far less opportunity to participate.
Thus, pursuing structural reform litigation on behalf of individual
plaintiffs would generally be worse than facing up to the problems of
class actions. 190
F. Ethical Concerns Regarding Remedies
Even if the children's lawyer manages to communicate effectively
with class members (and adult spokespersons) and deal with conflicts
of interest in the early stages of class action litigation, her most diffi-
cult ethical problems are likely to arise later, at the remedies phase.
Remedial choices in structural reform litigation involve complex
forms of injunctive relief with many opportunities for trade-offs
among subgroups within the class. These choices compel lawyers and
judges to assume seemingly legislative or administrative roles. 91
187. Il at 1256.
188. Garth, supra note 3, at 532.
189. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1258.
190. Luban, supra note 5, at 342-43; see Rhode, supra note 7, at 1195-97.
191. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1200.
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1. Developing the Remedy
Class counsel have an affirmative duty to seek out, inform, and mo-
bilize class members to ensure their participation in shaping the rem-
edy.192 In cases involving children, the techniques discussed above for
soliciting the views and facilitating the participation of class members
should be applied to inform the choice among remedial options. Cre-
ative measures may be necessary to enable class members to develop
informed views on remedies. For instance, in cases where the reme-
dies under consideration have been implemented in other jurisdic-
tions, class counsel should consider organizing meetings or phone
contact between class members and persons who have experienced
the remedial process in a similar case (e.g., young adults who went to
school under a desegregation decree, or lived in a juvenile institution
during its reform). 93
The attorney, however, must do more than communicate with the
class. Due to the political powerlessness and dependent status of chil-
dren, lawyers representing children in structural reform cases must
often seek input and cooperation from "outside actors"-and from
the defendant agencies and officials themselves-to shape a remedy
that truly serves their best interests. 194 For example, in Angela R. v.
Clinton,95 the expertise and cooperation of Arkansas' state health de-
partment was crucial in carrying out provisions of the settlement that
mandated better health care for foster children.
196
Hence, the class action lawyer's ethical duties in the remedy phase
may extend to ensuring broad participation by non-parties-govern-
ment agencies and other groups affected by or responsible for a reme-
dial decision. The attorney must facilitate a decision-making process
that factors in the knowledge and concerns of all these actors, while
maintaining the primacy of participation by class members. 97
Moreover, in planning remedies, children's class action lawyers
must again take account of the unique dependency of their child cli-
ents on the very institutions or service systems under attack. For in-
stance, one commentator on the Pennhurst litigation criticized class
counsel for dismantling an institution on which the children depended
for their daily needs and physical safety, without first building an ade-
quate alternative.198 An alternative strategy might have been to file a
right-to-education lawsuit to force the creation of community-based
192. Garth, supra note 3, at 521.
193. I am indebted to Professor Randy Hertz of New York University Law School
for this suggestion.
194. See Sturm, supra note 88, at 1364-65.
195. 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1993).
196. See id at 324.
197. See generally Sturm, supra note 88, at 1410-27 (discussing different models of
public remedial practice).
198. See Burt, supra note 44, at 295.
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schools for children with developmental disabilities, and then seek to
close down the institution.199
2. Ensuring Fairness Among Class Members
Some commentators criticize the tendency to concentrate solely on
procedural mechanisms for dealing with class conflicts as an evasion
of lawyers' ultimate responsibility for making decisions involving the
substantive fairness of remedies. 00 Morawetz, for example, argues
that "class representation demands a more careful articulation of how
to resolve questions of a just distribution among the members of the
class."
2 0
'
Similarly, Simon argues that lawyers cannot always rely on proce-
dural mechanisms to ensure the fairness of the results in a case; the
less reliable the procedures and institutions involved, the more the
lawyer must assume direct responsibility for ensuring substantive jus-
tice.20 2 In structural reform litigation involving children, where the
choice of remedy is often indeterminate and the class members are
often inarticulate, powerless, and unable to perceive or complain
about an unfair result, it is especially implausible to rely entirely on
procedural mechanisms to ensure substantive fairness.
Morawetz proposes criteria to evaluate the substantive fairness of
class action settlements, using a model that seeks to balance the prin-
ciple of equality (that some class members' interests should not be
sacrificed for others') and the principle of value (that it is also impor-
tant to obtain the greatest aggregate benefits from the lawsuit).2 3 She
suggests that the greater the degree of inequality among how much
class members will benefit from the settlement, the greater the addi-
tional overall value of the settlement must be.2°4
G. Ethical Duties After the Case Is "Won"
Commentators and veteran practitioners have pointed out that an
injunction or consent decree in structural reform litigation, to use
199. See id.
200. See Morawetz, supra note 7, at 4-8.
201. Id. at 9.
202. Simon, supra note 114, at 1097-98.
203. Morawetz, supra note 7, at 42-46.
204. Id. at 44. Under this model, a settlement giving some class members less than
what they could expect to win at trial might be permissible, because all class members
share an interest in the feasibility of the class action device, including a workable
system of settlement rules that generally results in settlements of real value. Md at 64-
65. The model would even allow settlements that provide no relief to some plaintiffs,
if this would permit a large increase in the overall value of the settlement, and if the
excluded class members had weak claims anyway. ME at 58. This would be "neither an
easy option," nor entirely "off the table," but would remain a choice to be "under-
taken reluctantly and with attention to the relative strength of the claims of class
members." Id.
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Churchill's phrase, "signals not the end, nor even the beginning of the
end, but only the end of the beginning of the remedial process."2 °5
Once a lawyer undertakes representation of a class of children, the
children's uniquely powerless and dependent status leads to the law-
yer's duty not to abandon the representation until relief has actually
been implemented. 6 Achieving compliance with remedial orders or
decrees in structural reform cases requires years of persistence, and a
"fairly sophisticated knowledge of bureaucracies and what is neces-
sary to break their momentum and shove them in a different direc-
tion."20 7 The litigation in Willie M. v. Hunt,08 after more than a
decade of advocacy and substantial successes, suffered a major set-
back when a dedicated and sympathetic administrator left the system,
which, along with increases in the number of children, lead to back-
sliding in implementation.2 0 9 Many foster care reform cases have
been active for over ten years.
2 10
Lawyers must also ensure that their child clients, and adults in-
volved with them, are engaged as much as possible in continued vigi-
lance. The establishment of a political base in the community to
support implementation of the remedy is a crucial element in achiev-
ing social change through litigation.21' This can happen only if the
groundwork of communication and client participation has been laid
throughout the litigation process.
H. Beyond Litigation
The lawyer's ethical duties in class actions involving children may
extend beyond the boundaries of the litigation itself. They may ex-
tend back to the preliminary stage of deciding which clients to repre-
sent and which cases to bring, and forward to the consideration of
alternatives to litigation. Lawyers may have ethical duties concerning
the distribution of the scarce resource of public-interest advocacy, and
may be obligated to engage in a rational and systematic case selection
process in choosing among the many potential groups of children-all
needy and powerless-who could benefit from representation. Cham-
bers and Wald recommend that lawyers engage in a "broad consulta-
tion process" with child development experts and other advisory
205. Rhode, supra note 7, at 1187.
206. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 274-78 (discussing methods by which the judge-
ment can be implemented).
207. l. at 275.
208. 564 F. Supp. 363 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 732 F.2d. 383
(4th Cir. 1984).
209. Sheryl Dicker, Afterword, in Stepping Stones, supra note 2, at 219, 220-21.
210. See generally National Center for Youth Law, Foster Care Reform Litigation
Docket (1995) (containing case summaries of child welfare reform cases, some of
which are class actions that have been pending for ten years or more).
211. See Bell, supra note 4, at 514; see also Garth, supra note 3, at 533-34 (arguing
that "class indifference" is the greatest threat to implementation of remedies).
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groups in choosing which cases to file and which advocacy strategies
to pursue.212
Moreover, after choosing whom to represent and which issues to
address, lawyers should consider administrative and legislative advo-
cacy strategies, and guard against an unexamined, self-serving prefer-
ence for litigation.213 Also, lawsuits and other advocacy strategies
may be complementary in that litigation may serve as a vehicle for
setting in motion other political processes, building coalitions and alli-
ances,2 1 4 and exposing injustice.
For example, advocates seeking to create an adequate juvenile
court system in Arkansas
conducted studies to document the problem; they lobbied to secure
remedial legislation; they negotiated with administrative agencies to
change government policy; they campaigned for a constitutional
amendment to establish a new court system; they used litigation to
challenge the system and to seek its abolition; and they continue to
use legislative and administrative advocacy strategies."s
CONCLUSION
The civil rights lawyer's standard answer to the challenge that she is
usurping legislative or executive power by trying to change public in-
stitutions through litigation is that she is merely representing the in-
terests of her client within the bounds of the law. The legitimacy of
the power she wields depends on the legitimacy of the representa-
tional relationship between lawyer and client.
But how does the lawyer "represent" an infant? A ten-year-old fos-
ter child? A sixteen-year-old youth confined to a mental hospital?
She cannot simply do what the client says, but she also cannot ignore
anything the client says and act on her own unconstrained view of the
client's interests. Her ethical duty is to communicate as well as possi-
ble with the child, to consult the child on key decisions as much as
possible, and also to communicate and consult with adults who claim
212. Chambers & Wald, supra note 36, at 132-36.
213. Id. at 525; Bell, supra note 4, at 511 n.134; Dicker, supra note 138, at 7-8.
Dicker's case study of efforts to oppose the Massachusetts workfare program is a vivid
example of the need for multiple strategies:
Workfare collapsed by the cumulative weight of numerous strategies used by
hundreds of members of the anti-Workfare coalition. Reliance on litigation
alone would have failed; reliance on lobbying alone without commensurate
use of the media, community organizing, and the statewide, grassroots ef-
forts to stymie placements [i.e. organizing local service providers to refuse to
employ people being forced to participate in workfare] would also have
failed.
Sheryl Dicker, Mothers and Children First: Advocates, the Massachusetts ET Pro-
gram, and its Child Care Component, in Stepping Stones, supra note 2, 11, 58.
214. Bell, supra note 4, at 514 n.142.
215. Don Crary & Sheryl Dicker, Reforming the Arkansas Juvenile Justice System,
in Stepping Stones, supra note 2, 197, 197-98.
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to speak for the child-but she must ultimately rely on her own judg-
ment of the child's best interests.
What about a thousand children? The lawyer's problem is com-
pounded by the potential for conflicts of interest among differently
situated children and by her duty to protect the interests of future
class members. Again, the lawyer cannot simply do what some indi-
vidual named plaintiff, or guardian ad litem, or even a majority of class
members, tell her to do. She must make normative judgments as to
the best interests of the class. But this judgment must be informed by
the greatest degree of input and consultation from the children in the
class, and from adults who may speak for them, feasible under the
circumstances of the case. The lawyer must also address conflicts of
interest among class members and ensure fairness in the relief ob-
tained. Finally, the lawyer's duty to represent child clients, especially
when her goals include political empowerment of poor and minority
children and their families and community, may take her outside liti-
gation entirely.
The lawyer should strive to fulfill her ethical duty of representation
in children's class actions not only to serve the abstract goal of legiti-
mizing structural reform litigation. She should do so for the intrinsic
value of creating and maintaining an ethical and humane relationship
with her clients-no matter how numerous, how young, how inarticu-
late, or how powerless.
In their little world in which children have their existence .... there
is nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt, as injustice.216
216. Charles Dickens, Great Expectations 64 (Margaret Cardwell ed. 1993).
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